Datadog
B API (API keys + application keys)
API and application keys never expire, but Datadog now lets an AWS-identified workload skip them entirely (Terraform provider for everyone, the Agent on Enterprise). Into your clouds it is keyless almost everywhere; AWS China and GovCloud-on-a-commercial-site still want access keys.
Docs: docs.datadoghq.com · Checked 2026-09-16 · source YAML · dispute via PR
Inbound B
How a workload running anywhere authenticates to this product.
Workload Identity Federation maps an AWS identity (proved via a signed STS GetCallerIdentity request) to a Datadog service account and issues a temporary JWT; every other client uses a static API key plus a static application key.
- Issuers
- AWS IAM (STS GetCallerIdentity)
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Workload Identity Federation lets you authenticate the Datadog Terraform provider and the Datadog Agent using cloud credentials instead of static API and application keys.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“AWS is the only supported cloud provider.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“If validation succeeds, Datadog issues a temporary JWT token for API access.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Application keys, in conjunction with your organization's API key, give users access to Datadog's programmatic API.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“OAuth is available only to approved Technology Partners developing official Datadog integrations.”
WIF is documented for exactly two clients: the Terraform provider ("Available for all customers" on commercial and government sites) and the Agent ("Available for Enterprise plans only", not on government sites). The token-exchange endpoint is not documented for arbitrary clients, so a custom workload cannot yet obviously use it; if that is what you need, you are back on static keys. Custom OIDC issuers, GitHub Actions, GCP and Azure identities are not accepted. OAuth2 exists but is partner-only ("Standalone OAuth clients are not supported") and bootstraps from a client secret, so it does not raise the grade.
Outbound B
How this product reaches into your cloud, repos, or other SaaS.
Cross-account IAM role with External ID (AWS commercial), service account impersonation (GCP), and a federated credential / OIDC workload identity on an app registration or the Azure Native managed identity (Azure); AWS China and GovCloud-on-commercial still require static access keys and Azure still offers a client-secret path.
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“To set up the AWS integration manually, create an IAM policy and IAM role in your AWS account, and configure the role with an AWS External ID generated in your Datadog account.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Access keys authentication is supported only for AWS accounts in the aws-us-gov (GovCloud) and aws-cn (China) partitions.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Access keys are required for AWS China* accounts and for AWS GovCloud accounts on a Datadog commercial site.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Assign the role of Service Account Token Creator”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Datadog and Azure establish a trusted identity relationship using an Azure federated credential and OpenID Connect (OIDC) workload identity federation.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“Datadog stores and authenticates with a client secret from your app registration.”
- docs.datadoghq.com checked 2026-09-16
“identity { type = "SystemAssigned" }”
Keyless on AWS commercial, GCP (impersonation; the GCP page no longer mentions JSON keys) and Azure (Datadog's "Secretless Auth" federated credential is the recommended path, client secret is optional). Graded B rather than A only because the AWS China and GovCloud-on-commercial-site cases still require a static access key. A strict reader may call that a partition edge case; the rubric says at least one integration wanting a static key is a B. Non-cloud SaaS integrations (Slack, GitHub, etc.) were not assessed.
Hygiene for any static credential the product still issues
| ✗ Expiry enforceable |
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| ✓ Rotation via API | Create, edit, and delete endpoints exist for both API keys and application keys.
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| ✓ Scoped keys | Application keys can be scoped; API keys (intake) cannot be scoped at all.
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| ✓ Last-used visible | Application keys expose last_used_at in the API and UI. The public OpenAPI spec shows no last-used field on API keys, so dead intake keys are harder to find.
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| ✓ Leak revocation | Datadog is a GitHub partner for Application Keys, Service Account Tokens and Personal Access Tokens. The plain "Datadog API Key" pattern is a non-partner (user) pattern only, so a leaked API key is detected but not reported to Datadog for automatic revocation.
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Notes
Datadog also issues Personal Access Tokens and service-account tokens; the OpenAPI spec shows those carry an expiration date and last_used_at, which is better hygiene than the API/app keys most integrations still require. Grade only moves if the WIF token exchange becomes usable by any client or accepts non-AWS issuers.
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